British Foreign & Imperial Affairs 1919-39
Britain: Foreign & Imperial Affairs 1919-39
A. Farmer
Chapter One – The Making of British Foreign Policy
Britain’s Position in 1919
· Lloyd George: “A land fit for heroes”
· Loss of active male population:
§ Britain: 5%
§ France 10%
§ Germany 15%
· Britain ended war with:
§ Army of 5,500,000 men
§ 58 capital ships
§ Over 100 cruisers
§ 20000 planes
· Empire provided raw materials and 2,500,000 colonial troops
· German fleet captured at Scapa Flow, empire lost, economy near collapse
· Japan and Britain allied since 1902
· In spite of millions of men being mobilised for armed forces, industrial output barely fell
· Britain was owed more money than she owed America
Problems Facing British Statesmen in the Inter-war Years
· PMs: Bonar Law, Stanley Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Neville Chamberlain
· Industrial Revolution ensured Britain was workshop and banking house before 1870
· Economic and naval supremacy helped Britain acquire more extensive empire
· Financial costs of war - £7,000,000 a day
· Elevenfold increase in National Debt
· 1920s – British manufacturers had a poor export record, high rate of unemployment
· Clear limits to amount Britain could afford to spend on defence
· Left thought Britain should enforce decisions of the League of Nations
· 1913 – 30% Britain’s government expenditure had been on defence. 1933 - fallen to 10%
· 1930s army under 400,000 strong, RAF fifth largest in the world
· 1935 – one arms manufacturer (Vickers-Armstrong) was still in business
· Baldwin (1932): ‘You will get nothing from America but words: big words but only words’
Who Made British Foreign Policy?
· Feeling in House of Commons - Chamberlain would have found it difficult not to declare war.
· 1918 extension of franchise, larger electorate (rise of Labour)
· Most wanted tax spent on health, social services and education
· Collective security (League of Nations) popular
· 1937 over 1500 newspapers and 3000 weekly periodicals
· Late 1930s – some 9 million homes owned a radio
· Mid-1930s – over 4300 cinemas, 23 million people went at least once a week
· 1938 – Chamberlain: well-intentioned peacemaker supported by patriotic and united Britain.
· Some historians think ‘elite’ controlled foreign policy in their own ‘class’ interests
· British foreign policy was largely shaped and determined by actions on non-Britons
British Interests
· Labour – come to terms with USSR, greater faith in disarmament and League of Nations
· Majority of MPs supported appeasement
· Foreign Office memorandum 4/26 - “keep what we have and live in peace… our foreign policy may appear to lack consistency and continuity, but both are there”
· Maintain balance of power in Europe as best insurance against renewal of war
· British interests were global rather than just continental
· Defence policy based on four main objectives
§ Protection of essential British trade routes
§ Security of UK
§ Defence of the empire
§ Readiness to co-operate defence of British allies
· Reverted to pre-war role of imperial police force
· Appeasement can be used to cover every manifestation of British’s diplomacy between wars
· Mainly Chamberlain’s policies to Germany 1937-38
Chapter Two – The Versailles Peace Settlement
Problems of Peace-Making
· 32 countries representing 75% world population assembled for Paris Peace Conference
· Breakdown on German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman empires resulted in economic chaos, famine, outbursts of nationalism throughout central and Eastern Europe
· Big Three held different views to ensure durable peace settlement
The Aims of the Peacemakers
· Wilson talked terms of peace based on justice, equality and democracy
· Wilson’s 14 Points: regarded as idealistic pipedreams by more hard-headed statesmen
· All had to retain support of USA
· Most people in Britain and France wanted a harsh peace
· Even Wilson accepted Germany should pay compensations ‘for all damage’
· All held very different views in part reflecting popular pressure to which they were subjected
· French casualties were highest sustained by Allied powers
· Germany should be reduced so all prospect of future military threat was eliminated
· No more than Frenchman expected
· Wilson was less interested in punishing Germany; no immediate military threat
· Wilson primarily concerned with equitable and lasting system of international relations
· Favoured League of Nations, principle of self-determination
· Lloyd George was anxious to preserve Britain’s naval supremacy and enlarge Empire
· 1918 election campaign: expected Germany to pay “to the limit of her capacity”
· Ready to destroy German militarism and support demands Kaiser should be hanged
· Lloyd George conscious of danger of leaving an embittered Germany, inclined to leniency
· Also feared if Germany was excessively humiliated she might be driven to arms of Bolsheviks
· J.M. Keynes (on Lloyd George): “rooted in nothing” “void and without content”
· Some believe principal aim was simply to win popularity at home
· Others regard him as most inspired and creative British statesman of 20th Century
· Lloyd George found himself able to mediate between Clemenceau and Wilson
The Main Terms of the Treaty of Versailles
· Territorial Changes
§ French frontier fixed on River Rhine
§ Germany should return Alsace-Lorraine
§ Rhineland occupied by Allies for 15 years
§ Saar region placed under League of Nations control for 15 years
§ Fourteen Points promised to create an independent Poland
§ French wanted strong Poland, supported most extreme Polish territorial claims
§ Danzig was made a Free City
§ 1921 plebiscite – 1/3 of Upper Silesia went to Poland
§ Polish Corridor separated East Prussia from rest of Germany
§ Germany lost all colonies
§ Britain gained German East Africa and the Cameroons
§ Australia took New Guinea
§ South Africa acquired South-West Africa
§ New Zealand got Samoa
§ Japan took all German possessions in China and Pacific north
§ Lloyd George: “virtually a codification of existing British practice”
· Armaments
§ No heavy artillery, tanks or aeroplanes
§ Army limited to 100,000 men
§ No capital ships and no submarines
§ Allied Control Commission was set up to police arrangements
· Reparations and War Guilt
§ 231 – “Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for all the loss”
§ Provided moral basis for Allied demands for Germany to pay reparations
§ Terms of Armistice would pay compensation
§ Sir Auckland Geddes: “to squeeze the German lemon till the pips squeaked”
§ Should include merchant shipping losses and costs of pensions
§ 1918 election Lloyd George promised to screw Germany “to the uttermost farthing”
§ 1921 – Reparations Commission recommended sum of £6.6bn (Britain get 22%)
· The League of Nations
§ Was Woodrow Wilson’s obsession
§ Germany should not be allowed to join
§ End of April 1919 – nobody had actually read the 440 clauses in full
§ Treaty of Versailles signed on 28th June 1919
Criticisms of Versailles
· Britain seemed to have gained what she wanted; German naval power destroyed
· Britain and her Dominions acquired German colonies
· British view – firm but just
· German view – major departure from Wilson’s Fourteen Points
· J.M. Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace – Wilson had been forced by a vindictive Clemenceau and scheming Lloyd George to over-harsh peace
· Condemned unworkability of the reparations clauses
· Germany lost 13% of pre-war territory and 10% of population
· Wilson and Lloyd George had offered France a defensive alliance
· US Senate refused to ratify the guarantee, British government did same
· A.J.P. Taylor – Allies failure to solve German problem in 1919 that laid foundations to WW2
· Others claim not the terms of Versailles but rather German hostility to the treaty
· Adamthwaite: “brave attempt to deal with intractable, perhaps insoluble problems”
· Lloyd George: “be there as a Court of Appeal to readjust crudities, irregularities, injustices”
· League lacked enforcement powers
· American Senate refused to ratify Treaty of Versailles, thus USA didn’t become a member
The Settlement of Eastern Europe
· Late 1918 Habsburg Empire fallen
· British and French statesmen would have liked to retain Habsburg Empire in some form
· French favoured creation of sizeable, economically viable and strategically defensible states
· 1920 treaties:
§ Treaty of St Germain Austria
§ Treaty of Trianon Hungary
§ Treaty of Neuilly Bulgaria
§ Treaty of Sevres Turkey
· Austria’s population fell from 28 million to less than 8 million
· Austria was left bitter and resentful
· Social, economic and political tensions in almost every Eastern European state
Turkey
· Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920
· The Straits (linking Black Sea and Mediterranean) de-militaries
· Arab areas of Ottoman Empire given as mandates to Britain and France
· 1922 – Turkish forces launched a major offensive in Asia Minor
· Britain could expect no help from France and lukewarm support from British Dominions
· End of September – Turkish forces reached Chanal, British base
· The Turks agreed to respect the international zone
· Treaty of Lausanne signed 1923
· Turkey retained Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, the Aegean islands, no longer pay reparations
Chapter Three – The Illusion of Peace 1919-31
Introduction
· Concerned with economic problems Law/Baldwin/MacDonald rejected adventurism
Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-31
· Hostility to Bolshevism
§ British left sympathised with communism and extolled proletarian triumph
§ General public opinion was hostile
§ Lenin made peace with Germany at Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918
§ Russia had no intention of repaying the war debts due to Britain
§ Churchill:”the foul baboonery of Bolshevism”
§ March 1918 – Britain sent troops to Murmansk and Archangel to ensure war supplies didn’t fall into Bolshevik hands
§ Sent 30,000 troops and £100million
· Divided Opinion in Britain
§ Left wing condemned British intervention in Russia
§ 1920 Polish forces tried to take over Ukraine from Russia
§ London dockers refused to load ship carrying munitions bought by Polish gov’t
§ General support for a ‘Hands of Soviet Russia’ general strike
§ British Communist Party – 4000 members in 1920
§ Comintern founded in 1919 preached World Revolution
§ Comintern claimed Britain was spearhead of capitalist-imperialist aggression
§ Soviet government urged need for normal relations
· Conciliatory Moves
§ March 1921 – Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, refrain from hostile propaganda
§ 1922 World Economic Conference at Geneva
§ Treaty of Rapallo – substantial economic/military benefits to Germany and Russia
§ 1924 – Labour Party came to power
§ August 1924 – Anglo-Soviet Agreement, guarantee a loan of £30,000,000
· Anglo-Soviet Problems 1924-31
§ Baldwin did not ratify Anglo-Soviet Agreement
§ Soviet donation to Miners’ Federation during 1926 General Strike angered gov’t
§ 1929 Labour gov’t restored diplomatic contacts, signed new commercial treaty 1930
The Problem of Italy
· Ambitions in Mediterranean seemed to pose a direct threat to British Empire
· Modest gains in Africa, annexed port of Fiume, strengthened Italy’s hold over Albania
The German Question in the 1920s
· Allied Disagreement
§ Enforcement of Treaty required same determination as war had done
§ America divorced herself from events in Europe
§ Germany had 50% more people and four times France’s heavy industry
§ 1920 – Channel Tunnel project was rejected by the Foreign Office
§ 23 summit conferences were held 1920-22
§ British representatives urged the French to relax the provisions of Versailles
§ 1920 and 1921 France occupied many German cities
§ Bonar Law and Baldwin wanted to adopt policies which would appease Germany
§ Wanted to reduce reparations and promote German economic recovery, help trade
§ Britain was owed 4x as much as she owed USA
· The Occupation of the Ruhr
§ January 1923 – French and Belgian forces occupy Ruhr
§ Passive resistance – production stopped, economy collapsed, hyper-inflation
§ British exports soared and unemployment fell as German competition disappeared
§ April 1924 – Dawes Committee proposed payments reduced and extended
· Locarno
§ Britain opposed French efforts to strengthen coercive powers of League of Nations
§ 1925 – Chamberlain took up offer with German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann
§ September 1925 met at Locarno
§ Germany to be welcomed into League of Nations in 1926
§ Germany’s western frontiers with France and Belgium accepted as final
§ Frontiers should not be altered by force
§ Locarno Pact was seen as a diplomatic triumph and a great landmark
§ Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
§ 1926 – Chief of Staff revealed no plans to give substance to new obligations
§ Locarno Pact did not denote any fundamental change in British policy
§ 1927 – French construction of Maginot Line
§ 1928 – Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war
§ 1929 – Young Plan extended period of reparation payments by 60 years
§ Britain and France agreed to end occupation of Rhineland 5 years early
The League of Nations
· Britain, France, Italy and Japan had permanent seats of Council of the League
· Council made majority of League’s decisions
· Article 16 – if member went to war, other states impose economic sanctions/military action
· Many believed no aggressor would dare risk war with the 50 League states
· Few Tory politicians really disputed in its efficacy for solving international disputes
· Military leaders pointed out League had no army of its own
· Most politicians wanted it to be an instrument for peaceful adjustment of international boundaries and other disputed matters
· Geneva Protocol – dispute to arbitration/rejecting decision of arbitrator would be regarded as an aggressor and liable to economic sanctions/military force
· Geneva Protocol rejected by Conservative government 1925
· Wide range of humanitarian and economic activities
· Leagues’ status further enhanced when Germany joined
Disarmament
· 1919 – Allies disarmed Germany
· By 1932 Britain was spending £102million on defence, compared with £760million 1919-20
· Naval Disarmament
§ American naval building programme aimed to create fleet larger than Royal Navy
§ America wanted Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 to end
§ Washington Naval Agreement, no of capital ships allowed:
ü USA 5
ü Britain 5
ü Japan 3
ü Italy 1.75
ü France 1.75
§ 1902 alliance replaced by Four Power Treaty signed by Britain, USA, France, Japan
§ Britain no longer had naval superiority
§ Avoided a wasteful and unnecessary naval race
§ 1927 – attempt to limit number of cruisers broke down
§ 1930 – USA, Britain and Japan agreed to limit cruisers to 10:10:7
§ Prolong the moratorium on the building of capital ships for a further five years
· Military Disarmament
§ 1926 - Preparatory Commission on Disarmament (mutual suspicion)
Conclusion
· Friendly feeling existed towards Germany following Locarno
· By 1931 Germany had secured substantial revision of the Treaty of Versailes
Chapter Four – The Empire 1919-39
The British Empire in 1919
· Lord Curzon ‘18 “The British flag has never flown over a more powerful and united empire”
· ¼ of world’s land surface was part of British Empire, no competition
· Had financial and commercial pre-eminence in many areas
· Small uprisings e.g. Egypt 1919
· Few questioned the moral and technical superiority of Britain’s civilisation
· By 1919 some countries acquired a large degree of independence
The Importance of the Empire 1919-39
· Empire was increasing important to Britain’s trading position
· Imports from the Empire:
§ 1910-14 25%
§ 1935-39 39.5%
· Exports to the Empire:
§ 1910-14 36%
§ 1935-39 49%
· 1926 – an Empire Marketing Board set up to ‘bring the Empire alive’
· Some saw Empire as solution to economic problems and an antidote to socialism
· Imperialist groups such as Royal Empire Society and British Empire Union set up
· Empire Day 24th May
· Feature films such as The Drum and The Four Feathers gave a positive image of Empire
Imperial Weaknesses
· The Dominions were more or less self-governing
· Status of other 80 territories differed
· Most had governor who has small council for day-to-day policy and larger assembly to give legal validity to laws and taxes
· Dominion Office dealt with Dominions
· Indian Viceroy supervised by India Office
· Rest over-seen by Colonial Office
· Grandiose schemes for an imperial economic system never matures
· Africa and Asia new educated elites increasingly resented British rule
· Anti-British riots in Egypt 1919
· Expenditure on imperial defence rather than welfare was seen in Britain’s best interest
· Britain’s old industries: textiles, iron, steel, engineering – less competitive.
· Other industries slow to develop
· British army under 200,000 strong
· From 1860s Irish nationalists had been vociferously demanding home rule
· 1916 – role in rebellion in Dublin (‘Easter rising’)
· 1918 general election – Sinn Fein set up Irish Parliament in Dublin, declared independence
· British government prepared to use terror against the terrorists
· Economic situation: Britain’s dependence on imported food, need for export markets = reason for maintenance of Empire
· Decolonisation after 1945 was effected by course and impact of WW2
The Dominions
· The Situation in 1919
§ Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Free Irish State after 1922
§ Had own parliaments
§ Britain still controlled their foreign policies
§ Decision for Dominions to go to war was taken by British Cabinet alone
§ Dominions were represented separately at Paris Peace Conference and League
§ 1917 – Lloyd George established an Imperial War Cabinet
§ Dominion leaders met in Conference in London
· Disunity
§ Not prepared to accept limits of freedom ‘continuous consultation’ would involve
§ 1922 Chanak crisis – Britain could not expect automatic support from Dominions
§ Diplomatic unity of British Commonwealth was fiction
§ 1923 – Canada signed fishing agreement with USA without reference to Britain
§ 1930s most Dominion leaders favoured appeasement
· The Balfour Declaration and Statute of Westminster
§ 1926 – Commonwealth Conference agreed on Balfour Declaration
§ Dominion “Autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status”
§ Churchill had no sympathy with idea of imperial unity by free cooperation
§ Almost unanimous chorus of approval to Balfour Report
§ Statute of Westminster 1931 – Dominions given right to change own constitution
· Imperial Preference
§ 1932 – Britain officially abandoned free triage, introduced Import Duties Act, (imposing 10% tariff on imports”
· Britain’s Relations with the Dominions
§ 1932 – Fianna Fail became largest party in Ireland
§ De Valera wanted a united and independent Ireland
§ End of 1932 – ‘trade war’ (increasing duties against goods from each other)
§ 1937 – new Irish Constitution laid claim to all 32 countries of Ireland
§ South Africa 1924 – coming to power of Nationalist Party
· Loyalty to the Mother Country
§ British government spent £6m encouraging emigration to Dominions in 1920s
§ Britain remained vital market and important source of capital
§ 1939 Mr Menzies of Australia immediately announced they too were at war
§ 1939 South Africa supported a policy of neutrality
§ General Smuts forced a debate, majority for war 80 votes to 67
§ Only EIRE stood for neutrality
India
· The Situation in 1919
§ 1921 – 150,000 Europeans living in India, ruling native population of 250m
§ 10 provinces under direct British administration
§ Most of India ruled by Indian princes with whom British had treaties
§ Acute poverty and ignorance were massive
§ Afghan invasion in 1919 was easily defe4ated
§ Indian National Congress Party, formed in 1880s, supported independence for India
§ Muslim League founded in 1906
§ Political concessions were demanded as price for continued support in war
§ Few people believed India was ready for real democracy
§ 1919 Government of India Act – Indians allowed some power to determine policy
§ Viceroy given power to legislate by decree for six months in case of emergency
· Gandhi and Passive Resistance
§ Qualified as barrister in London
§ 1915 – Joined Congress Party
§ Devised and instigated new methods of civil disobedience to disrupt British rule:
ü Days of fasting and prayer
ü Refusal to pay taxes
ü Boycotting of British goods
ü Deliberate flouting of law
§ Often spilled into violence (Gandhi seen as a hypocrite)
· Amritsar
§ 1918-19 – economic problems, global influenza epidemic killed millions of Indians
§ Rowlatt Acts gave provincial governors power to imprison without trial
§ Amritsar, Punjab region – several Europeans killed in rioting
§ 13/4/1919 – defiance of a ban on public meetings, large crowd assembled. Soldiers were ordered by General Dyer to fire. 379 people killed, 1200 wounded
§ Official enquiry criticised Dyer
§ Many saw him as ‘saviour of India’ and fund to pay defence costs raised £26000
· Talk of Reform
§ Less dependent on London
§ 1927 – review of workings of 1919 Act led by Sir John Simon (no Indian members)
§ Dominion status was ‘natural issue of India’s constitutional progress’
§ Churchill found himself at odds with Baldwin, resigning from shadow cabinet
§ Churchill not included in new administration until after outbreak of war 1939
§ 1930 - Gandhi’s 241 mile march make salt without paying salt tax attracted attention
§ World-wide slump in agricultural prices effected Indian peasantry who were concerned with rent and interest rates rather than home rule
· The 1935 Government of India Act
§ Envisaged all-India federation including princely states
§ Would be elected Indian parliament, British viceroy remain head of state
§ Widening of franchise
· The Outbreak of the Second World War
§ Viceroy Lord Linlithgow announced India at war without consulting Indian leaders
§ Congress leaders refused support unless it could participate as an independent state
§ Called on all Congress provincial governments to resign office
British Dependencies
· 1919 – 80 British colonies/dependencies
· Most cases economy was primitive
· Little pressure for ‘home rule’
· Colonies thought too valuable to be voluntarily given up
· Only colonial people granted self-rule: 30,000 whites ruling 1m blacks (Southern Rhodesia)
· Colonial governors had considerable freedom and often acted without reference to London
· Colonial rule had to rely upon locally recruited subordinates
· Official gov’t policy – colonies should be financially self supporting
The Middle East
· British Influence
§ Security of Suez Canal was fundamental
§ Discovery of oil made region important economically
§ Few politicians supported T.E. Lawrence who dream of Arab states becoming “our first brown dominions and not our last brown colonies”
§ Interference with local society was generally kept to a minimum
· Egypt, Iraq and Trans-Jordan
§ 1922 – Egypt’s independence, Sultan became King Fuad I
§ 1936 – Egypt control over its own army, 10,000 British troops in Suez Canal Zone
§ 1922 – Iraq granted independence
§ Mandate formally ended 1930, Iraq accepted presence of British military bases
· Palestine
§ 1917 Balfour – “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People”
§ 1925 – Considerable Jewish immigration
§ 1929 – Serious anti-Jewish riots
§ 1930 – White Paper proposed limit on future Jewish immigration – no further action
§ Palestine seen as Jewish sanctuary
§ 1936 – Arab revolt
§ 1937 – Peel Commission recommended partition into Arab and Jewish state
§ 1939 – White Paper abandoned idea of partition; unpopular with Arabs
§ Jewish immigration limited to 10,000 a year for 5 years, additional 25,000 in 1st year
· Conclusion
§ Pre-1939 Britain confident she could preserve her dominance
Chapter Five – The Gathering Storm 1931-6
Depression and Disarmament
· Depression
§ From 1931 there were to be increasing threats to international peace
§ 1929 – Coal, textile, shipbuilding, iron, steel industries badly affected
§ Trade fell by 10%
§ By 1932 – 20% of British work force was unemployed
§ 1931 – Britain was forced to come off Gold Standard
§ 8/1931 – general election asked electors asked to give National Gov’t free hand
§ National Gov’t won 554 MPs against 61 (largest majority)
§ Conservatives won 473 seats – 75% of House of Commons
§ Depression encouraged all countries to think of themselves
§ Import Duties Act 2/32 imposed 10% tax on imported goods not from Empire
§ Established imperial economic bloc
· Disarmament
§ Reluctant to maintain defence expenditure
§ Labour/Liberal politicians for disarmament as the chief element of foreign policy
§ 8/1933 – East Fulham by-election a Conservative was defeated by a pacifist
§ 1933 Oxford Union resolved 257-153 “this house will not fight for King or Country”
§ World Disarmament Conference met at Geneva in February 1932
§ French leaders were not prepared to reduce forces without guarantees of security
· Increasing Problems
§ Germany – 5,000,000 unemployed in 1932
§ June 1932 – met at Lausanne.
§ Germany agreed to final payment of 2.6m marks to European Reconstruction Fund
§ Depression made some countries more peaceful
§ Others undermined democracy, led to gov’ts coming to power which favoured war and foreign conquest as means of acquiring new lands, markets and raw materials
The Problem of Japan
· 1920s – Japan major imperial power
· Secured Formosa from China in 1895, Korea from Russia in 1905, German colonies in China and pacific north after 1918
· Japan was nominally a constitutional monarchy governed by liberal coalitions
· Japanese disappointed by their gains from WW1, favoured expansion
· Territorial expansion could provide raw materials Japan lacked
· September 1931 – units in Japanese army seized a number of points in Manchuria
· China appealed to League of Nations – fear Article 16, all to war. Economic sanctions.
· China did not immediately appeal to invoke Article 16.
· League of Nations did little, appeal to China and Japan to refrain from worsening situation
· February 1932 – Japan occupy whole of Manchuria
· British politicians were critical of Japan, particularly when Chinese forces were attacked near Shanghai (Singapore had oil). Not prepared to recognise Manchukuo
· Japan had brought prosperity to part of Manchuria she controlled
· 1931-2 British forces in Far East small. Singapore and Hong Kong undefended
· British navy wasn’t strong enough to enforce sanctions
· USA, Japan’s biggest trading partner, didn’t support League actions
· October 1932 – Lytton Commission – accepted Japan’s grievances condemned methods
· Recommended Manchuria should have autonomous status under Chinese supervision (42:1)
· Britain accepted Japan’s take-over and hoped Japanese threat wouldn’t develop
· ’10 Year Rule’ –assumption that no major war would occur in 10 years abandoned
· Neville Chamberlain was keen to r4estore friendly relations with Japan ASAP
· This might reduce cost of improving defences to combat Japan
· Japan made it clear she would end existing naval agreements and increase navy
· Anti-Comintern Pact, November 1936 (Germany-Japan) alarmed Britain. Although aimed against USSR, posed threat to Britain
The Problems of Germany
· Adolf Hitler
§ 1933 – Hitler comes to power
§ End restrictions on German rearmament and her right to remilitarise the Rhineland
§ Aim for lebensraum (living space) for Germany in east, at the expense of Russia
§ In Mein Kampf he spoke of Britain as a potential ally
§ A.J.P. Taylor I The Origins of the Second World War – claimed Hitler was an ordinary German statesman with a rather ordinary mission
§ Most think Hitler was a clear and cold-blooded general purpose
§ Sir Robert Vansittart, civil servant in Foreign Office, warned ministers in 1933
§ Defence Requirements Committee 1934: ‘We take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom out long-range defensive policy must be directed’
§ Some thought Britain should help German recovery
§ This was supported by Bank of England and Board of Trade
· Hitler’s First Moves 1933-4
§ Hitler admired Britain, hoped ‘two great Germanic nations’ could work together
§ October 1933 – Germany withdraw from League and Disarmament Conference
§ Excuse was neither treated Germany as equal
§ Churchill 1934 “Germany is arming fast and no one is going to stop her”
§ Sir John Simon 1934 “Germany already has in effect a fleet of 600 military aeroplanes and facilities for its very rapid expansion… three times as great as that authorised by the treaty”
§ In 1934 Britain began to spend more money on the RAF
§ Labour: rearmament “jeopardising the prospects of international disarmament”
§ 1934 – French push ahead the building of Maginot Line
§ Italy rushed 100,000 troops to Austrian border as warning against Hitler
§ Hitler did nothing to help the Austrian Nazis and the putsch failed
· Germany Rearms
§ March 1935 – Hitler declared Germany had air force, introduction of conscription
§ Germany army would be increased to about 500,000 men
§ Heads of gov’t and foreign ministers of Britain, France, Italy met at Stresa April 1935
§ Agreement known as Stresa Front
§ May 1935 – France and Russia concluded treaty of mutual assistance
§ June 1935 – Britain signed a Naval Agreement with Germany (right to build up to 35% of Britain’s capital ships and to be allowed parity in submarines)
§ Seemed to be condoning Germany’s rearmament after Stresa Front’s condemnation
§ In 1935 it had approval of Admiralty, Foreign Office and entire Cabinet
§ Given Japanese threat Britain had no wish to face a greater danger in home waters
§ Britain maintained a naval superiority twice as great as in 1914
§ Nazi dictatorship was unpopular in many quarters in Britain, especially on the left
The Problems of Italy 1935-6
· Anglo-Italian Relations before 1935
§ Mussolini had ambitions of making Mediterranean an ‘Italian lake’
§ Mediterranean was seen as vital to British trade routes
§ Italy saw herself as a ‘have-not’ power rather than committed to status quo
§ By 1935, Italy wanted to increase Italian Empire in Africa by taking over Abyssinia
§ 1934 – skirmish over border water-holes at Wal Wal, excuse to prepare attack 8/35
· March
§ January 1935 – Laval visited Rome, promised Mussolini free hand in Abyssinia
§ No ‘formal’ mention of Abyssinia in Stresa Conference April 1935
§ Britain made it clear - not approve of Italian annexation of whole of Abyssinia
§ June 1935 – Stanley Baldwin replaced MacDonald as Prime Minister
§ Vansittart considered Germany main threat to Britain – appease Italy
§ Abyssinian Emperor, Selassie, prepared to accept some loss of land
· British Reaction to the Italian Invasion of Abyssinia
§ Britain had unsuccessfully opposed Abyssinia’s entry into League 1923
§ Public opinion in Britain strongly opposed Italian invasion
§ Peace Ballot 1934 - 11,500,000 votes, 95% thought Britain should stay in League
§ Imports from Italy exports to her banned by virtually all members of League
§ 70% of Italy’s trades was with League members
§ Labour and National Gov’t supported collective security, benefits of disarmament
§ National Gov’t won a handsome victory, 11.8 million votes winning 432 seats
§ Britain and France applied trade embargo against Italy
§ Hoare-Laval Plan
ü Italy would receive one third of Abyssinia
ü Selassie would remain Emperor and be ceded strip of Italian territory
ü Plan was leaked to press, storm of indignation
§ Hoare said he had no regrets and claimed policy offered best solution
§ March 1936 – Britain voted for oil sanctions but refused naval blockade
· The Situation by 1936
§ May 1936 – Selassie fled and Abyssinia became part of Italian Empire
§ June 1936 – Chamberlain: continuation of sanctions ‘midsummer of madness’
§ Abyssinian crisis death blow to League of Nations; failed to deter or halt aggressor
§ Mussolini felt bitter at the way he had been treated by western powers
§ Churchill’s view – failure to check Mussolini was step on way to world war
§ Britain failed to uphold collective security of appease Mussolini
The Rhineland, Spain and Rearmament
· The Rhineland
§ March 1936 – German remilitarise Rhineland, violating Versailles and Locarno
§ Excuse was ratification of 1935 Franco-Soviet alliance, claimed it was a threat
§ German forces had orders to withdraw at first sign of French opposition
§ France had forces available, unstable political situation made call to arms unlikely
§ British opinion: Regrettable matter, not particularly threatening
§ Lord Lothian: Germany had every right to walk into its own ‘backyard’
§ German troops began to build fortifications along French frontier
§ Many historians regard Rhineland was ‘last chance’ to stop Hitler without war
§ Only a few British politicians, e.g. Churchill, pressed for resolute stand
§ Eden – much to gain by accepting German move and take seriously Hitler’s new proposals for a 25-year non-aggression pact
§ Britain and Germany remained on reasonably good terms between 1936-7
§ Germany continued to rearm but not to scale that many in west believed
· The Spanish Civil War
§ Right-wing nationalists, led by General Franco, supported by monarchists, Catholic Church and most of armed forces
§ 2000 from Britain went to Spain to enjoy International Brigade against Franco
§ Britain’s aim was to prevent war spreading, becoming a general European conflict
§ Non-Intervention Committee discouraged intervention on either side
§ League of Nations was largely ignored
§ Mussolini supplied aircraft, armaments, 100,000 men to help Nationalists
§ Germany sent fewer men, used it to test value of new weapons/military techniques
§ Russia sent men and weapons in effort to help communists on Republican side
§ Forces of communism against the forces of fascism
§ Civil war lasted three years
§ Many in Britain were convinced that should a general war occur, the line-up would be on ideological grounds rather than on grounds of ‘national interest’
§ Let to improved relations between Italy and Germany
§ November 1936 – Mussolini proclaimed Rome-Berlin Axis
§ 1937 – Italy joined Germany and Japan in Anti-Comintern Pact
· Rearmament
§ Germany rearming, Italy potential threat in Mediterranean, Japan had large army
§ League system was bankrupt
§ Extra military spending would mean sacrificing more popular programmes
§ 1935 Defence White Paper concluded “Additional expenditure on the armaments of the three Defence Services can no longer be postponed”
§ 1936 Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip appointed
§ Cherwell described appointment as: “the most cynical thing that has been done since Caligula appointed his horse as a consul”
§ 1936 – four-year plan for rearmament including tax on tea
§ Introduction of conscription in 1939
§ Prepare for several different types of war: colonial/naval/great European war
§ Air defences were concern, far less money was spent on army
§ Gov’t began to stockpile strategic materials, detailed plans - economic mobilisation
§ Economic rearmament was hidden from public
§ Britain’s population was small (47m, Germany’s was 67m)
§ Rearmament was a slow and limited process
§ Treasury officials and military experts realised economic strength, 4th arm of defence
§ Churchill favoured defence spending, ignoring constraints of industrial capability
Chapter Six – Chamberlain and Appeasement: 1937-8
Neville Chamberlain
· Background
§ 1937 Stanley Baldwin retired
§ Chamberlain wasn’t a politician until 1918 when he was nearly 50
§ Was patriots who wedded idea of British Empire, hated socialism
§ Baldwin had lacked dynamism, after 1935 accused of allowing policy to drift
§ Determined to control foreign policy not civil servants, Foreign Secretary or Cabinet
§ His leadership was autocratic
· Aims
§ Those who supported appeasement seen as ‘Guilty men’ after WW2
§ Chamberlain seen as Guilty Man Number 1
§ Many historians now view appeasement in a more positive light
§ As Chancellor had been good at noting interconnections of foreign/financial policy
§ War “wins nothing, cures nothing, ends nothing”
§ Believed that settlement of many grievances of Germany/Italy/Japan was possible
§ Had been a businessman, liked idea of face-to-face business-like discussions
§ 1930s France ruled by weak and short-lived gov’t, Chamberlain had no confidence
§ 1930s USA was overwhelming isolationist, had no wish for foreign entanglements
§ Neutrality Acts preventing USA from selling arms/giving loans to countries in war
§ USA would not stand against Japanese aggression
§ Canada and South Africa reluctant to be involved in European problems
§ Australia and New Zealand more worried about threat from Japan
§ Chamberlain believed Hitler “utterly untrustworthy and dishonest”
§ Until adequately armed “we must adjust our foreign policy to our circumstances and even bear with patience and good humour actions which we would like to treat in a very different fashion”
§ Suspicious of Foreign Office, claimed in private it has “no imagination [or] courage”
§ Sir Nevile Henderson – British ambassador in Berlin
§ Winston Churchill was the most prominent anti-appeaser
§ Churchill seen as a right-wing maverick and war-monger
§ Labour proposed no real alternative course of action
§ They preached a strong policy supported only by strong words
The Problem of Japan 1937-9
· July 1937 – Chinese-Japanese hostility escalated into full-scale war
· Japan proclaimed her intention of securing new order in East Asia
· USA showed no signs of wanting to play a decisive role in East Asia
· Fear of Japanese aggression = Britain wanted to conciliate Italy and Germany
Chamberlain’s Initiatives in Europe 1937-8
· July 1937 – impossible to fight Germany, Italy and Japan
· Only solution was separating these powers by diplomatic means
· Autumn 1937 – Chamberlain sent Lord Halifax to visit Hitler
· Britain was ready to consider giving Germany some colonies in Africa
· Britain continued to provide Germany considerable economic assistance
· January 1938 – Chamberlain imitated Anglo-Italian talks but outcome was inconclusive
· Eden felt his authority as Foreign Secretary was being undermined
· Eden disliked Chamberlain’s attempts to appease Mussolini
· Eden: Mussolini “complete gangster whose pledged word means nothing”
· Eden resigned in February 1938, replaced by Lord Halifax
· Replaced anti-German Sir Robert Vansittart with Under-Secretary of State Sir Alec Cadogan
· April 1938 – Britain would recognise Italy in Abyssinia for withdrawing troops from Spain
· Spring 1938 German actions in central Europe assumed greater significance
The Anschluss
· Since 1934 – Austrian gov’t struggled to keep Austrian Nazis under control
· Until 1936 gov’t had support of Italy. Closer Italy/Germany became, less support for Austria
· February 1938 – Austrian Chancellor visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden
· Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi leader became Minister of Interior
· Plebiscite enabled Austrian people decide whether they wished to become part of Germany
· Germany invaded; feared plebiscite would go against him
· Chamberlain was not opposed to the Anschluss but the way it happened
· France without gov’t simply protested
The Problem of Czechoslovakia
· The Situation in Czechoslovakia
§ Creation of Czechoslovakia has been “affront to self-determination” (Churchill)
§ Half of 15m population had been Czechs
ü 2m Slovaks
ü 750,000 Hungarians
ü 500,000 Ruthenians
ü 100,000 Poles
ü 3.25m Germans (mostly in Sudetenland)
§ Nazi press increasingly bitter attacks on Czech gov’t
§ Benes – if all ethnic groups were given independence, Czechoslovakia wouldn’t exist
§ Czechoslovakia had preserved a democratic constitution
§ It treated its minorities better than other countries
§ Churchill thought Czechoslovakia was worth fighting for, Chamberlain didn’t
§ Chamberlain had sympathy for Sudeten Germans
§ Wanted Sudetenland given to Germany without force
· Chamberlain’s Policy
§ Britain had no Treaty obligation to defend Czechoslovakia
§ Chamberlain 3/1938: “abandoned any idea of giving guarantees to Czechoslovakia”
§ Early spring 1938 Hitler had appeared to have no designs on Czechoslovakia
§ Chamberlain’s main policy was to get concessions from Czech gov’t without force
§ This had support of Lord Halifax, Cabinet and Foreign Office
· Increased Tension
§ Czech gov’t wasn’t in any mood to make concessions
§ May – after false reports of German movements, Czech mobilised reserves
§ May crisis critical factor into persuading Hitler towards military confrontation
§ “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action”
§ It might be a way by which France could escape from responsibilities of its alliance
§ August – mission by Lord Runciman met the vaious parties, no agreement
§ British intelligence suggested Germany planning war early autumn
§ Inconceivable Czechoslovakia would give up large amount of territory
§ Czechoslovakia quickly declared martial law
The Munich Conference
· Plan Z
§ Chamberlain would fly to meet Hitler face-to-face and ask what his demands were
§ Chamberlain: the proposal was “unconventional and daring that it rather took Halifax’s breath away”
§ Plan Z received “unanimous and enthusiastic” approval from Cabinet
§ Accepted Hitler’s main demands that areas with German majority given to Germany
§ Cabinet and French won over with comparative ease
§ Czech government appalled at situation
· Godesberg
§ 22/9/38 – Chamberlain flew back to Germany
§ Hitler demanded to right to occupy the Sudetenland by no later than 1 October
§ Cabinet, angry at Hitler’s bullying tactics, rejected Godesberg proposals
§ France would honour commitments to Czechoslovakia
§ Britain and France began to mobilise
ü Trenches dug in London parks
ü 38 million gas masks distributed
§ Chamberlain’s personal envoy Horace Wilson went to talk to Hitler – failed
§ 27/9 British ambassador in Italy asked Mussolini to use his influence
· Munich
§ Hitler accepted Mussolini’s suggestion of Four-Power Conference
§ 29/9 Chamberlain, Daldier, Hitler and Mussolini met at Munich
§ 12 hours of talks – early hours of 30th September
§ German occupation of Sudetenland was to be carried out in 5 stages over 10 days
Munich: Success of Failure?
· Many historians think Chamberlain was outplayed by Hitler
· German military superiority over western powers would never again be so great
· 1938 – most people in Britain and France thought of Munich as a triumph
· President Roosevelt sent Chamberlain telegram with words “Good man”
· Germany was not as strong in 1938. Short of
§ Tanks
§ Fuel
§ Ammunition
§ Trained officers
§ Reserves
§ Luftwaffe was not ready or able to launch serious attack
· French army was still best in Europe
· Neither France or Britain were prepared for war
· Britain had few fighter aircraft and little radar defence
· Britain lacked support of several of her Dominions
The Aftermath of Munich
· In private, Chamberlain regretted using terms “peace with honour” and “peace for our time”
· It might be possible to make progress “along the road to sanity”
· Churchill described it as “total and unmitigated disaster”
· Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty resigned. 30 Conservatives abstained
· Daily Worker, Reynolds News, Manchester Guardian had reservations.
· Majority of newspapers supported
· Poll results
§ 10/1938 believing Hitler 93% No
§ 10/1938 increased expenditure on armaments 72% Yes
§ 02/1939 Views on appeasement 46% Give us time
· December 1938 Franco-German agreement expressing mutual goodwill, respect frontiers
· Hitler made a number of anti-British speeches
· German press continued to make venomous attacks on Britain
Chapter Seven – The Coming War 1939
The Uneasy Peace, January-March 1939
· February, Cabinet agreed that a German attack on Holland/Switzerland = declaration of war
· Britain drew closer to France
· British not prepared to repeat great “effort of blood” made in WW1
· Chamberlain: France “never can keep a secret for more than half an hour – nor a government for more than nine months”
· November 1938 – British Chief of Staffs opposed to conducting talks with France
· Britain committed itself to raising an army of 32 divisions
· Best policy was “to hope for the best but be prepared for the worst”
· Rearmament had long been geared to reach its peak in 1939-40
· Production of aircraft increased from 240 a month in 1938 to 660 a month in 1939
· 9/1938 only Thames estuary had radar, 9/1939 – radar chain from Orkneys to Isle of Wight
· 11/38 – Sir John Anderson brought into Cabinet, in charge of air raid precautions
· Britain and France’s economic strength and power of naval blockade should ensure victory
· Chamberlain was much more confident of Britain’s capacity to fight
The End of Czechoslovakia
· Slovaks had little love for Czech-dominated state
· Early March President Hacha proclaimed martial law
· Hitler met Hacha on 15th March
· Hacha suffered minor heart attack
· 15th March – German troops entered Czechoslovakia, pretext that it was on verge of civil war
· German protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia independent under German protection
· Hitler ignored Munich agreement, broken signed agreement with Chamberlain, dismembered neighbour without warning or provocation
· Czechoslovakia collapsed because of internal disruption
· This freed British government of any obligation
· “No reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders”
The Polish Guarantee
· German-Polish Relations
§ 21st March – Lithuania returned Memel. Britain/France took no action
§ 800,000 Germans in Poland
§ Danzig 96% German, although a Free City had been run by Nazis since 1934
§ No German gov’t was likely to accept Danzig solution as permanent
§ German-Polish non-aggression treaty in 1934
§ October 1938 – Ribbentrop asked Poles to give up Danzig. In return Poland receive border guarantees, German friendship and territory in Ukraine
§ 1/1939 – Hitler met Colonel Beck demanding road/rail link across Polish Corridor
§ Hitler admitted wasn’t all he wanted – needed Poland’s economic/labour resources
· The Guarantee: Wise or Foolish?
§ 31st March – Britain offered guarantee to Poland
§ Poland was a right-wing military dictatorship
§ Until 1939 Poland had few friends except Germany
§ Poland had distanced herself from League of Nations, accepted Japanese/Italian expansion, won territory from Czechoslovakia in 1938-9
§ Chamberlain did not see the guarantee as a total commitment of Poland
§ March 1939 Hitler’s Chief of Staff prepare for war with Poland by end of August
The Drift to War
· Mussolini’s Actions
§ April 1939 – Italian forces occupied Albania
§ Definite breach of Anglo-Italian agreement
§ Chamberlain hoped Mussolini would be restraining influence on Hitler
§ ‘Pact of Steel’ – further military alliance May 1939 between Italy and Germany
· The Mood in Britain
§ Public opinion – standing firm
§ Faster rearmament, alliance with USSR, broadening National Gov’t inc. Churchill
§ March 1939 – doubling of territorial army
§ April 1939 – Conscription
· Hitler’s Actions
§ 5/1939 – Told generals intended to attack Poland “at the first available opportunity”
§ June 1939 – Goebbels conducted anti-British campaign
· Chamberlain’s Position
§ Japan imposed a blockade on Tietsin, important centre of British trade in China
Anglo-Soviet Relations
· Relations 1931-8
§ USSR seen as hostile and dangerous to traditional British values and interests
§ Faced with Nazi threat abandoned hostility to League, supporting collective security
§ 1935 USSR signed defence pacts with France and Czechoslovakia
§ Russia’s appeal international conference after Anschluss dismissed as premature
· Chamberlain’s Policy in 1939
§ Chamberlain, March 1939: “profound distrust of Russia”
§ He believed policy of encirclement might lead to rather than prevent war
§ 80% of Russia’s senior army officials killed/imprisoned in purges
§ F.A. Voight: “persons living even under the Nazi terror could hardly conceive of such a thing” (terror in Russia)
§ Opinion polls:
ü Side would you see win Russia:Germany 85:15
ü Fascism vs Communism Communism 74%
ü UK/USSR more friendly Yes 84%
ü Military alliance UK/USSR/France Yes 84%
· Anglo-Soviet Negotiations in 1939
§ April 1939 Chamberlain agrees to negotiations with Russia
§ Favoured ‘association’ not fully-fledged Soviet alliance
§ Halifax invited to Moscow declined invitation. Eden offered, turned down
§ British mission led by Admiral Reginald Alymer Ranfurly Pluckertt-Ernle-Erle-Drax
§ Did not see why Russian troops in Poland should be necessary or desirable
· The Nazi-Soviet Pact
§ Nazi-Soviet agreement made no sense in ideological terms
§ January 1939 – German diplomats began to make overtures to Russia
§ 23/8/1939 – Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact signed
§ Stalin’s PoV Nazi-Soviet Pact best to protect Soviet interests
The Outbreak of War
· Chamberlain believed Britain, France and Poland strong enough to deter Hitler
· 22nd August sent letter to Hitler stating if German attacked Poland Britain would fight
· 52/8/1939 – Britain and Poland signed treaty of alliance
· Mussolini’s announced Italy intended to remain neutral despite Pact of Steel
· Hitler – If Germany given free hand in Danzig and Corridor he would agree to guarantee British Empire and agreement on disarmament
· Attacked Poland 1st September
· Line of contact were kept open in case of sudden change of heart
· 31/8 Mussolini proposed conference to try to resolve Polish crisis – too late
· Germany claimed wireless stations near Polish border had been attacked (LIE)
· 2nd September – Britain still had not declared war or sent an ultimatum to Germany
· 3rd September – 9am – Britain delivered ultimatum
· 3rd September – 11am – Britain declared war
· 3rd September – 5pm – France declared war
· Within one weeks Australia, New Zealand , South Africa and Canada had declared war
· Gallup Poll – 89% in favour of “fighting until Hitlerism was done away with”
An Assessment of Neville Chamberlain
· The Case Against Neville Chamberlain
§ One of main ‘guilty men’ who failed to stand up to Hitler
§ Churchill thought Second World War was “unnecessary” (The Gathering Storm)
§ Only correct policy was to stand firm against Hitler at earliest opportunity
§ Some historians think we had no moral obligation or self-evident interest to Poland
§ Appeasement “crashed in ruins”
· The Case for Neville Chamberlain
§ Policy of avoiding confrontation by negotiation/concession was British tradition
§ Justice didn’t become injustice because it was demanded by a dictator
§ 750,000 lives lost ion WW1
§ Another war would be ruinously expensive, damaging Britain’s economic position
§ Hoped that active diplomacy would reduce threat of war
§ France had more tanks and troops than Germany, soon have more planes
§ For Hitler, war was a historical and racial necessity
§ Chamberlain’s declaration of war: “You can imagine what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed. Yet I cannot believe that there is anything more or anything different I could have done that would have been more successful.
Chapter Eight - Conclusion
The Guilty Men
· Churchill, March 1938: “Historians a thousand years hence will still be baffled by the mystery of our affairs”
How Great was Britain?
· Her economy was strong enough to bind all countries of Empire to British imperial system
· 1932, at its peak, Empire covered ¼ of land surface and ¼ of world population
· By 1931 most developed parts of Empire – ‘white’ Dominions – effectively independent
· ‘Great’ British Empire was something of a ‘paper tiger’
· Britain’s declining ability to shape world affairs owed much to economic strength
· Poor management, inability to exploit ideas, outdated technology, poor salesmanship, low rate of investment, overpowerful trade unions shoddy workmanship, bad labour relations = downturn in economy
· Unemployment reached peak of 3m in early 1930s
· During WW1 German submarines had threatened to starve Britain into surrender
· Baldwin 1934: “The old frontiers are gone. When you think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine.”
· London: home of 1/5 of British population, centre of gov’t, finance and trade made it target
· 1937 Chief of Staff estimated 20,000 casualties in London in 24 hours, rising to 150,000 in a week
· There was only 147,000 casualties in WW2
· Chamberlain 1938: “we were in no position to justify waging a war today in order to prevent a war hereafter”
What Alternative Policies Might Britain Have Adopted?
· Gov’t critics in late 30s demanded Britain should play tough world policeman role
· Left believed League would preserve peace
· Politicians such as Churchill tended to overestimate Britain’s strength
· Treasury officials argued war would weaken an already strained economy
· Economic strength was Britain’s fourth arm of defence
· Public opinion preferred government spending on social welfare
Blame or Sympathy?
· Most British statesman accepted Britain had no interest in central/eastern Europe
· By allying with Poland, Britain broke one of cardinal tenets of her foreign policy: no commitments in Eastern Europe
· Given the problems faced, they seem to deserve sympathy as well as blame